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“If you want to cry, cry on the green mats of Kodokan” 
or 
Aspects of Cultural and National Identity in the Inclusion of Judo into the Olympic 
Program 
 
Kodokan judo was included into the Olympic programme for the first time in 1964. 
Efforts to have judo staged as an Olympic discipline had failed in earlier years and its 
acceptance as such during the 57th IOC meeting in 1960 at the Excelsior Hotel in 
Rome was tantamount to a fundamental rehabilitation of Japan as a nation and has 
to be seen as part of the reintegration of the Axis powers into the 'Olympic family' that 
had already begun to materialize in 1952. The inclusion of judo marked the first time 
that a non-European sport was adopted as an Olympic event, and the high level of 
ability and presence of Japanese athletes in three out of four weight classes helped 
to fulfil Japan’s wish to demonstrate its own strength to the world and to strengthen 
its national identity. Despite such victories, however, the defeat of the Japanese 
KAMINAGA Akio to the Dutch Anton Geesink in the open class - ironically - became the 
lieu de mémoire.  
In this article I will address the question, in how far judo as an Olympic sport played a 
dominant role in the (re)construction of a cultural and national Japanese identity. In a 
second step I will discuss the Western image of judo and the internationalization or 
olympification of Kodokan judo.  
 
Road to hosting the Games in 1964 
 
John MacAloon writes in his article The Turn of Two Centuries: Sport and the Politics 
of Intercultural Relations: “To be a nation recognized by others and realistic to 
themselves, a people must march in the Olympic Games Opening Ceremonies 
procession”.1 Taking part in the Games is therefore not only a question of being 
recognized, that is to present the nation to the outside, but is also a question of 
cultural and national identity. Attesting to the validity of these observations the 
Olympic Games had play a vital role in Japan’s international rehabilitation as well as 
restoring Japanese national identity following the nation’s defeat in World War II. 
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However the IOC denied Japan the right to “march” in the first post war games of 
1948.2 Japan’s rehabilitation as member of the world community only began when 
the Japanese Olympic Committee, that had been re-established in May 19483, was 
recognized in 1951 on the Vienna meeting of the IOC – the same year Japan signed 
the peace treaty and one year later regaining her sovereignty. The reintegration of 
Japan into the world community was strongly supported by Douglas MacArthur, the 
Supreme Commander for the Allied Forces in Japan. In a letter addressed to J.-J. 
Garland, the US IOC member, MacArthur writes: “It is my personal hope that 
conditions will make it possible for Japan to be a competitor with the other nations of 
the world in 1952. Performances in swimming during the Occupation indicate that, in 
this sport particularly, the Japanese may be expected to make outstanding records. 
Participation in the Games at Helsinki should contribute greatly to a deeply felt and 
desirable goal of the Japanese people to join again with other nations in peaceful and 
cultural pursuits.”4 On 25 June 1950 the Korean War had started, marking a course 
turn in the politics of the occupational authorities in Japan. Japan became an 
important factor in the fight against communism. Although Article 9 of the Japanese 
constitution denied the right to have an army, a “Police Reserve Force” was 
established the same year and with the support of the US, former war time leaders 
(including convicted war criminals) were able occupy influential positions in 
government, bureaucracy and industry once again. By the participation of Japanese 
athletes in the Olympics MacArthur, whose attitude towards Japan had always been 
a paternalistic one,5 wanted to show that the ‘bad child’ was allowed to play with the 
others again. And Japan ‘played’ considerably well in the 1952 Olympics in Helsinki: 
72 athletes participated, winning one gold (free style wrestling), six silver and two 
bronze medals. In the end Japan was placed 17th in the total medal ranking; one 
place before Britain and way ahead of Germany that ended up place 28. 
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Aware of the symbolical meaning of hosting Olympic Games, the Tokyo parliament 
decided to apply for hosting the games of 1960 already in 1952. However the 
election in 1955 chose for Rome, but immediately Tokyo decided to apply for the 
Games of 1964.6 
When the Japanese decided to apply for the Games of 1964, state organs took the 
leading role on all levels of decision making. Important meetings of the commission to 
prepare the games where held in the residence of prime minister Kishi Nobusuke – a 
convicted war criminal - and the organizational efforts were bundled within the 
Ministry of Education (Monbushô).7 Under the guidance of the Ministry of Education 
the games were programmatically used to re-socialize Japan into the World 
community as well as to promote and strengthen a Japanese identity, which centered 
around the terms hitozukuri (forming people) and konjôzukuri (building spirit, builiding 
perseverance). Seki Harunami in his book Sengo Nihon no supôtsu seisaku (“Sport 
politics in Postwar Japan”) shows that Japanese sport politics in Japan after WW II 
went – under the guidance of the occupational forces - through a short process of 
democratization only to find a goal that better suited their goals in the 50s: medals. 
After all, in the end it is not enough to just march in the games; to be recognized 
among the competing nations it is the medals that count and how can you become 
more realistic? In order to enhance the chances of medals, sport education and 
governmental sport sponsoring became centered around the building of athletes that 
were able to win in international competitions.8 
 
The question of the hosting city of 1964 was discussed on the 54th IOC Session in 
1958 that was held in Tokyo. Although the question of the hosting city was postponed 
to Melbourne, the members of the IOC were able to get a first hand impression of the 
sport situation in Japan. Especially as they could witness the organizing qualities of 
the Japanese during the Third Asian Games that - opened, as well as the IOC 
meeting, by the Japanese emperor – took place at the same time (opened May 24th 
in Tokyo, so in fact directly after the IOC meeting). An account in the Bulletin du 
Comité International Olympique summarizes: “They [the members of the IOC] were 
pondering, while witnessing the Games, whether Japan is likely to be a worthy 
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successor to Rome in the matter of organizing the next Olympic Games. One can 
almost guess that they left Tokyo most favourably impressed.” 9 
The decision for the XVIII Games was thus to be decided in Munich 1959 and the 
JOC, especially its president Azuma Ryôtarô, tried to find allies for the Japanese bid 
and it was Avery Brundage, who became the most important supporter and actor 
behind the scene. During the Munich session the Tôkyô delegate (HIRASAWA 
Kazushige and YASUI Seiichirô), presented their bid and answered questions on May 
25th from 4.55 p.m. onwards. Tokyo was elected with 34 votes (Detroit 10, Vienna 9, 
and Brussels 5) during next day's session.10  
The decision for Tokyo meant that the Organizing Committee had considerable 
influence on the selection of the sports to be conducted during the games and the 
Japanese organizers were able to have judo included into the program for the first 
time. Judo’s inclusion into the Olympic program “was”, as Guttmann writes, “clearly a 
favour done to the Japanese host’s”.11 However this statement ignores the fact that 
not only Japanese politicians and sport administrators but also sportsmen from 
Japan, Europe and the United States pressed for an Olympic Judo. The inclusion of 
judo into the Games was thus not a mere generous gesture. 
 
The long way to Olympic judo  
 
Kanô Risei - son of the judo founder Kanô Jigorô - head of the Kodokan and 
president of the International Judo Federation (IJF) had asked for including judo into 
the Olympic program in 1952 for the first time.12 The IJF had been recognized by the 
IOC only one year earlier (September 15, 1951) as representing international body of 
the non Olympic sport judo. The question of an Olympic judo was thus put on the 
agenda of the Mexico meeting in 1953. However, during this session it was decided 
to postpone the discussion whether judo should be including into the list of optional 
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sports to 1954. Ironically enough the question was then placed in the agenda under 
“Reducing the Games’ Program”.13 And the odds were against judo in 1954. The 
Executive Committee of the IOC decided on their meeting in Athens “that no new 
sport shall be introduced at the Melbourne Games of 1956”.14 During the meeting of 
the IOC Committee which followed that of the Executive Committee the final decision 
was postponed after the French representative Armand Massard, 1920 Olympic gold 
medalist in fencing, argued that volleyball, roller-skating and judo could “well be 
entered on the list of optional sports”.15 The question of including judo (as well as 
volleyball, archery and roller-skating) into the program of the Olympic Games was 
thus discussed again on the 50th Session of the IOC 1955 in Paris. However none of 
these four reached the necessary quorum of two thirds (in this case 34 votes). Judo 
even ended last with only 3 votes (volleyball 26; archery 19, roller-skating 7).16 It was 
certainly too early for a Japanese sport to enter the Olympics. It should also not be 
forgotten, that the Japanese Olympic Committee had only been recognized in 1951 
on the Vienna meeting of the IOC and that its members still had reservations towards 
the Japanese.  
But when in 1960 the IJF asked again to include Judo into the program of the 
Olympic Games (KANÔ Risei to Avery Brundage May 14, 1960), Tokyo was already 
chosen to host the 1964 summer games, and Kanô Risei could rely on political 
support in Japan. Besides the strong support of by then Tôkyô governor Azuma 
Ryôtarô, the motion was supported by the “Judo Federation of Japanese Diet 
Members” that was formed in 1961. The president of the Federation Shoriki 
Matsutarô describes as the groups aims “to make the whole nation raise the Olympic 
movement, to make complete arrangements for the enforcement of judo event at the 
18th Olympic Games to be held in Tokyo” (Shoriki Matsutarô to Otto Mayer, June 6, 
1961). 
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When the candidature of the IJF to list judo as an optional sport was discussed 
during the 57th IOC Session in Rome (1960) it was at the same time connected to the 
question, whether judo should be included into the Tokyo Games: “This federation 
[IJF] asks to be recognized as an Olympic sport, and that JUDO [sic] be included in 
the programme of the Tokyo Games.”17 The Japanese representative Azuma 
Ryôtarô strongly supported the candidature of judo during this session and 
expresses his hope that judo might be included in the program of the Tokyo Games. 
The assembly after hearing the members – Francois Piétri, Josef Gruss and Ferenc 
Mezö - decided to accept the candidature by 39 to 2 votes.18 Despite this decision it 
was not yet sure that judo would be on the program. 
The decision to accept the candidature left the IOC members as well as the 
Organizing Committee with the question of how to reduce the program of the games. 
The plan to limit the sport events had been on the agenda of the IOC for a while and 
a commission was supposed to propose a change of Rule 30, which stipulated the 
number of sports for the games. When the question of judo was discussed, Brundage 
made clear, that “the mere fact of including Judo in the Tokyo Games inevitably calls 
for an adjunction to the list of sports prescribed in Rule 30”19. During the Session in 
Rome K. Andrianov and A. Romanov proposed a change of the first sentence of Rule 
30 which allows only for 18 sports, and the following change is decided: “The official 
program shall include minimum eighteen and maximum twenty-one of the following 
sports…”20 However in the end Rule 30 reads as follows: “A minimum of fifteen and a 
maximum of eighteen of the events enumerated above must figure in the program.”21  
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Already during the JOC Congress in December 1960 the Organizing Committee of 
the Tokyo Games, which had been organized in September 1959, decided to put 
judo on the list of sports to be practiced during the Tokyo Games. Following Rule 30 
the Tokyo Committee first limited the events of the Tokyo Games to 18: “The Tokyo 
Committee suggests the elimination of the Modern Pentathlon (owing to lack of 
horses in Japan) and the rowing events. On the other hand, it asks for including Judo 
and finally proposes a maximum of 18 sports to figure on the program of the 1964 
Games.”22 However on the next day (June 21) a heated debate around the number of 
sport events for 1964 arose. Brundage had already one day earlier mentioned that 
the number of sports did not matter, as long as they were in accordance with the 
Olympic Rules. After further discussion the final vote decides on 20 events, 
eliminating handball and archery.23 But Judo was only an optional sport. And the 
officials of the IJF already knew in 1963 that judo would not be part of the Games in 
1968.24  
The success of the bid to host the games of 1964 can highly be ascribed to the 
support of Avery Brundage, whereas the success of the IJF candidature certainly 
owes to the support of IOC chancellor Otto Mayer. In a letter to KANÔ Risei Mayer 
writes: “You may be assured that I shall do all what is in my power to help you.” (May 
28, 1960) To make sure that the members of the IOC are “acquainted with this sport”, 
he advices his friend Eric Jonas, who at that moment is vice-president of the 
European Judo Federation, how to proceed: “I helped him a lot and told him how to 
act. He is now organizing an action so that every member of the I.O.C. here in 
Europe will be visited by a Judo man in view of having his vote! In our next Bulletin 
he will give me a text for an article which I shall publish” (Otto Mayer to AZUMA 
Ryôtarô, May 24th 1960).25 No surprise thus, that Kanô thanked Mayer already on 
August 23d for his support (KANÔ Risei to Otto Mayer August 23, 1960).  
The Japanese organizers –  so in fact state organs - were politically pushing for judo 
as an Olympic sport as it could represent Japanese tradition to the world and could 
serve as reference for a - yet to be defined - Japanese self-identity. However to 
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clearly understand the meaning the inclusion of judo into the Olympics meant for 
Japan and the Japanese, we have to understand the meaning judo has in the 
construction of the cultural and national identity of Japan and the formation of 
‘Japaneseness’. 
 
Judo and Japanese national identity 
 
Judo was developed by the physical educator Kanô Jigorô in 1882 as a 
modernization of traditional Japanese jujutsu-styles. For Kanô Jigorô judo was not a 
mere form of martial fighting, but a form of education. In the late 19th century, under 
the guidance of the education minister Mori Arinori, we witness a reorientation of 
Japanese education towards moral education, that was to serve the needs of the 
state (kokka no tame no kyôiku). Physical education was in this period to provide the 
state with healthy and patriotic young men that were needed to build a nation with a 
strong economy and military (fukoku kyôhei). With the development of judo, Kanô 
reacts to this nation-centered educational philosophy and in 1889 he explains: “Judo 
is not morality but moral education in the broad sense. If we include judo as subject 
into the curriculum of our schools throughout he country, it can certainly compensate 
the weak points of our present educational system, support the character formation of 
our pupils and strengthen their patriotism. Should we ever have international 
conflicts, and should we ever be attacked by enemies from all sides, by following the 
teachings of judo, we not feel fear and will not surrender. And in peaceful times the 
foreigners will admire the development in our country as well as our customs and 
habits. If we follow the teachings of judo […] the time in which our country will be one 
of the strongest civilized countries will be close.”26 Kanô thus implemented the idea of 
building patriots through the training of judo into his Kodokan judo and presented his 
new martial sport to governmental institutions as a tool to build a national identity, 
which Japan desperately needed to overcome the feeling of inferiority towards the 
West. Judo was predestined to serve as a metaphor for the Japanese self-image and 
nation of the Meiji-period as it was seen as a martial art in which a physical weaker 
men could overcome a physically stronger men, by means of technique and spirit. In 
Kanô’s autobiographical writings as well as in the biographies Kanô’s ‘confrontation’ 
with the West plays a prominent role. Kanô is constructed as protector of the nation, 
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who, through the training of judo, is able to demonstrate the Japanese spirit to the 
world: A individuals personal history unites the nation’s imagined future.  
Judo in the early 19th century was far from being a fixed system. It underwent a 
series of technical, organizational and theoretical modifications. When Kanô came 
into contact with the Olympic Movement and the Olympic idea after he was elected to 
become the first Asian member of the Olympic Committee in 1909, his ideas shifted 
towards a more internationally orientated perspective. Kanô incorporated de 
Coubertin’s sport philosophy into judo and hoped to include Japanese martial arts, 
especially kendo and judo, into the Olympic program: “I hope that martial arts and 
athleticism will develop hand in hand. Even though they are different, their goal is still 
the same: The strengthening of body and mind. It is therefore wise to include kendo 
and judo and the attitude of bushidô into the Olympic Games.”27  
In the 30’s and early 40’s judo however became more and more intertwined with 
Japanese ultranationalism. It had been part of the curriculum in middle schools as 
early as 1911. In the early 19th century however no clear distinction was drawn 
between the tradtional jûjutsu styles and judo that was merely seen as a form of 
traditional wrestling. Only in 1926 had judo reached a hegemonial status in 
education, superseding the tradtional jûjutsu-styles. In 1931 judo together with kendô 
finally became compulsory. During the 30’s and 40’s judo was more and more seen 
as part of a pre-military education and nationwide mobilisation; reinvented as “a 
counter to Western values to infuse Japan’s modern sports culture with Japanese 
spirit”.28 As part of the war machinery, judo was held accessory to the Japanese 
participation in the war and subsequently the Supreme Commander for the Allied 
Forces forbid the training of judo, like that of all other martial arts with the exception 
of sumô. Only in 1949 / 1950 was judo allowed to be officially taught again. The 
same year the Zen Nihon Judo Renmei was founded and Kanô Jigorô’s son, Kanô 
Risei, was elected as president. By this move, the Kodokan was able to control the 
development of judo in Japan.  
In the Japanese discourses of the postwar period - in movies, literature and songs - 
judo can be seen as a metaphor of Japan as well as a means to transmit post-war 
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values. In the enka (popular) song29 Sugata Sanshiro (text by Sekizawa Shinichi) – 
referring to Tomita Tsuneo’s 1942 wartime novel, made into a movie by Kurosawa 
Akira one year later - we read: 
 
Keep in your heart the saying  
“It is not important to win against others, 
but to win against yourself”. 
Train hard without complaining 
The moon laughs, Sugata Sanshiro 
 
More than the flowering gras 
I love the spirit of the gras that has been trampled down 
but is still alive 
What I love is the love that is forbidden 
When I cry it rains 
Kodokan. 
 
“Train hard”, one of the major maxims of sport politics in the late 50s and 60s mirrors 
the spirit of the postwar year, in which the nation’s effort were bundled in the task of  
rebuilding the country (kunizukuri) and putting Japan on the road to economical 
growth and prosperity. In yet another enka song entitled Jûdô ichidai (“A Life for 
judo”, text by Hoshino Tetsurô, 1963) we read: “A life for judo / I throw a light into the 
darkness of the world.” Rebuilding the country asked stamina as well as personal 
sacrifice from everybody and this ‘patriotic’ spirit is connected to Kodokan judo. In the 
metaphorical framework of these popular songs judo and the Kodokan serve as 
homeland (furusato) of a imagined community Japan. It should not be forgotten that 
judo training had been part of the education for most Japanese men in their 30s and 
they had incorporated and memorized not only the moves, but also the atmosphere 
of the training halls and the training spirit. Judo thus became a space of shared 
nostalgia; a place were the past was connected not only to the present but to the 
(shining) future as well. 
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Maguire had noticed that male sport "appears to play a crucial role in the construction 
and representation of national identity"30 and also Roche linked male sport cultures to 
the shaping of personal and group identities.31 Despite the fact that women already 
trained judo in Japan around the 1910’s (first accounts already date from before 
1900) and the Kodokan had established a department for women in 1926, Judo 
remained a male sport (especially the tournaments), containing the modes to 
construct a masculine identity and embodying the idea of defending the nation. 
Throughout Japanese history the wrestler had been seen as representative of his 
home. During the Heian-period (784-1185) at the imperial court and during the Edo-
period (1600-1868), wrestlers were granted special status in society. When 
Commodore Perry came to Japan in 1853 and 1854 sumo wrestlers were present 
and the Americans invited to throw a punch at their impressive bellies. In the years 
following the forced opening of Japanese harbors, woodblock prints went on sale in 
which sumo wrestlers were depicted defeating Western soldiers and sailors - 
digesting and healing a nation’s cultural shock. Sumo wrestlers during that time were 
certainly “symbols of Japan’s might in the face of the invaders from the West.”32 In 
the past wrestling fights were thought to show the well-being of a province and the 
matches between foreigners and Japanese were supposed to show that the nation 
was up to the foreign ‘threat’. The significance of these matches can be seen in, what 
is called Santeru jiken (The Santel Incident). In 1914 Itô Tokugorô, a 5th dan in judo, 
was defeated by the American wrestler Ad Santel. In 1917 Santel also beat the 
judomen Miyake Tarô and Sakai Daisuke in Seattle. In 1921 Santel came to Japan to 
challenge the Kodokan. The fights took place at a highly symbolical location: 
Yasukuni shrine. The shrine where the souls of the soldiers that had died for the 
emperor during the restoration war and later wars were worshipped. Santel won his 
fight against Nagata Reijirô and managed a draw against Shoji Hikô.33 Another 
prominent example is the wrestler Rikidôzan, who was able to drew huge masses 
into the stadiums during the 50s. His specialty were fights against “huge” and dirty 
fighting foreigners that he usually defeated following a well structured choreography. 
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These victories certainly helped to soothed the memories of Japan’s defeat.34 The 
expected and anticipated victories in the judo competitions at the Tokyo Olympics 
were meant to achieve even more. Tagsold has shown that through the Olympics the 
symbols of Japan’s imperialistic and nationalistic past, the tennô as well as the 
military, were positively reconstructed and included into the new Japanese national 
identity.35 By including judo into the Olympic program, Japan was thus able to 
rehabilitate just another of its wartime tools and to show not only to the world, but 
also to its people the value of its tradition that forcefully had to be denied in the early 
post war years. 1964 in this sense marks an important year in which tradition was to 
become a reference of and source for a cultural and national self-identity again. But 
how traditional was judo in 1964? What did the inclusion of judo meant for the 
Olympic Movement and its internationalization?  
 
Internationalisation of judo 
 
Japanese jujutsu began to spread to the Western World during the early 20th century. 
In Seattle a training hall was opened in 1903 and in England jiu-jitsu spread with the 
arrival of Tani Yukio in 1900 and Koizumi Gunji in 1906. In Germany it was Ono 
Agitarô, who taught jiu-jitsu as early as 1906 to the military in Berlin. These early 
figures taught traditional Japanese jujutsu styles and not the newly developed judo. 
However it was the style Kodokan judo of Japanese wrestling that became 
dominating not only in Japan, but also in the US and Europe. This success can be 
ascribed to Kanô Jigorô’s influence as sport administrator and politician, and also by 
his far-sighted move to sent teacher abroad and to award dan-graduations to key 
figures in the already established European jiu-jitsu community; thus binding these 
sportsmen to the Kodokan. This form of friendly take-over can be seen in England, 
where Tani Yukio and Koizumi Gunji were awarded second dan after they joined the 
Kodokan, but it was also applied in Germany, France and Austria. Another important 
factor is that Kodokan judo was higly organized and centralized. As Frühstück and 
Manzenreiter state: “With numerous schools, ideologies, and masters striving hard to 
coexist, jujutsu could never establish the strong following that judo did.”36  
                                                 
34
 Cf. Buruma, Inventing Japan, 5. 
35
 Tagsold Die Inszenierung der kulturellen Identität in Japan, 73-85. 
36
 Frühstück; Manzenreiter, "Neverland lost”, 77. 
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Although the early teachers were mostly Japanese, European judo went through a 
process of acculturation and developed along Western sporting traditions (it should 
however not be forgotten, that the creation of judo itself was based on Western sport 
concepts and Western sport education). That has partially to with the fact that judo 
teachers in Europe included their own experiences, won in the – at that time - very 
popular circus fights. But also fighting rules like weight classes were newly 
introduced. The system of multicolored belts spread most likely from Paris, where it 
was introduced by Kawaishi Mikonosuke, in the second half of the 1930’s.  
 
The European development of judo after the war took shape with the foundation of 
the European Judo Union (EJU) in London on July 28th 1948 – only one day after the 
formation of the British Judo Association. The EJU was founded under the initiative of 
the London based Budokwai and representatives from Italy, Holland, and Switzerland 
participated (one French observer). The first European Championships were held in 
1951 - a time in which judo in Japan only started to recover. 
The field of judo was in the first post war years dominated by Western sport 
administrators and sportsmen. The need of a international body became more and 
more evident and on its fourth meeting in 1951 the EJU was dissolved just to be 
automatically replaced by the International Judo Federation (IJF). However the 
written proposal put forward by the Kodokan to place the headquarters in Tokyo was 
declined, and only on its second meeting in 1952 was the position of president 
offered to the head of the Kodokan, Kanô Risei.37  
Power and dominance are reflected in space and during the 60s as well as early 70s 
not only was the IJF headquarter situated in Tokyo and its president Japanese, but 
the first championships in 1956 and 1958 were also held in Japan. In both years 
Japanese fighters placed first and second.38 The world came (back) to the birthplace 
of judo, only to be shown that the Japanese were still superior in their fighting skills. 
In contrast to the European weight classes, the first three world championships only 
knew one weight category: the open. This meant that the comparable small 
Japanese fighters had to face bodily stronger European and American fighters. 
                                                 
37
 Kanô Risei remained president until 1965. He held the office of the head of the Kodokan between 
1946 to 1980. Cf. Jûdô Daijiten Henshû Shûinkai (ed.), Jûdô Daijiten, 109. 
38
 World Championships 1956: 1. Natsui Shokichi (JPN), 2. Yoshimatsu Yoshihiko (JPN), 3. Anton 
Geesink (NED), 3. H. Courtine (FRA); World Championships 1958: 1. Sone Koji (JPN), 2. Kaminaga 
Akio (JPN), 3. Yamashiki Noriyoshi (JPN), 3. Pariset B. (FRA). For detailed descriptions of the 
program as well as all fights see Kodokan (ed.): Kanô Jigoro Taikei, Betsumaki, 1127-1134. 
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Fighting in only one weight category went in hand with the idea that ‘a weaker person 
can overcome a stronger through technique and spirit’. And the Japanese technique 
and spirit was seemingly better in the 50’s. But already in 1961, when the 
Championships were held outside Japan for the first time, Anton Geesink won the 
title of world champion,39 and the Japanese became aware that technique and spirit 
might be fine, but that it would still be better to show that in weight classes. The 
decision to have different weight classes during the Olympics in Tokyo certainly 
helped Japan to win as many as three gold medals and one silver medal in the four 
weight categories.40 But 1961 was also foreshadowing Geesink’s victory at the 
Olympics and the end of the dominance of the Kodokan in terms of administration, 
rules and fighting skills. 
When judo administrators in the IJF and EJU hoped to turn judo Olympic, a 
paragraph concerning amateurism was added into the statutes of the IJF in 1961. 
“Only judokas who are amateurs strictly in respect of the rules defined by the 
International Olympic Committee can take part in the Olympic Games”41, thus 
adopting judo even more to the modes of Western sports. Guttmann states that “the 
Olympic program remains essentially Western”42, despite the inclusion of judo. It is 
certainly true, as we have seen, that judo developed along the path of modern sport 
and according to Olympic rules. However it is not the ‘reality’ we find in changed 
rules, that governs our perception of cultural phenomena, but the reality of our own 
cultural history of perception. Who cares about European weight classes, colored 
belts and the ‘amateur rule’, when on the screen Westerners in white ‘kimonos’ bow 
to each other to apply ‘mysterious techniques’ the Japanese have developed 
‘hundreds of years’ ago? In other words, in order to understand what the inclusion of 
judo meant for the Olympic Movement, we have to understand the construction of the 
other, of Asia and more specific of Japan. 
 
Western construction of judo as Japanese martial art 
 
                                                 
39
 World Championships 1961: 1. Anton Geesink (NED), 2. Sone Koji (JPN), 3. Koga Takeshi (JPN), 3. 
Kim T.P. (KOR) Cf. Kodokan (ed.): Kanô Jigoro Taikei, Betsumaki, 1134-1137. 
40
 Cf. Frühstück; Manzenreiter, "Neverland lost”, 80.  
41
 Letter from the IJF (P. Bonet-Maury; Kano R.; A. Ertel) to IOC, June 5
th
, 1961. Already one month 
earlier the European Judo Union (EJU) had informed the IOC about the changes adopted by the EJU, 
that were to become the guidelines for the IJF. See letter from EJU to IOC, May 30, 1961.  
42
 Guttmann, Games and Empires, 138.  
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The image of Japan in the early 20th century is characterized by exotification. Japan 
is seen as place of spirituality, of the mysterious, as a paradise long lost to the highly 
‘technicized’ West. Part of the concept of Japan was the image of the small Japanese 
body (which certainly holds true, when compared to the average size of Europeans). 
However, this image of the small Japanese was also connected to the idea of the 
weak Japanese. Therefore we see the fascination with a martial arts system that 
apparently gave these ‘small people’ the power to fight against bigger and stronger 
enemies. When the first jiu-jitsu fighters like Tani Yukio came to Europe, it was 
exactly this image that determined the reception of the discipline, and when Japan 
defeated Russia in 1905 it was a deep shock to Western nations. Sports writers of 
the time claimed that Japan’s military success was connected not only to a hygienic 
way of living or vegetarian nutrition, but also to jiu-jitsu. Ludwig Bach for example 
argues in his book Verteidige dich selbst (“Defend Yourself”) written in 1928 that the 
Japanese were able to “compensate for the physical characteristics of their race” by 
employing jiu-jitsu.43  
This approach to the Japanese culture, which is still predominant in the 1950’s and 
1960’s is based on a general dichotomy of Western technology and Eastern 
spirituality. In a speech Avery Brundage gave in Tokyo during the 54th Session of the 
IOC we read: “Undoubtedly the East has gained from its association with the West in 
the Olympic Movement and its adoption of Western methods of physical training, in a 
stronger and healthier people. But, what about the West? What will the West gain 
from this meeting on the fields of sport, with people of different ideas of life, different 
customs, and different viewpoints? Well, if the East gains in a physical sense, 
perhaps the West will gain intellectually and spiritually. The wisdom of the East is 
proverbial, and Asia, after all, was the birthplace of all the great religions. Fair play 
and good sportsmanship are a part of all religions as well as of the Olympic Code.”44 
The question of a Western perception of Asia and judo is mirrored in the struggle for 
international recognition by representing judo as governing body in the Olympic 
movement. 
 
The emergence of the new international body meant a economical threat to the 
already jiu-jutsu clubs in Europe. But only when the IJF started its initiative to have 
judo included into the Olympic program can we see resistance from the International 
                                                 
43
 Bach, Verteidige dich selbst, 3-4, see also Niehaus, ‚Miushinawareta Kanô Jigorô’, 41-46. 
44
 Bulletin du Comité International Olympique, No. 63 (August 1958), 44. 
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World Judo Federation (IWJF), that combined different forms of jiu-jutsu and judo, 
like judo-do, developed by Julius Fleck in the late 40's in Austria, under its wings. The 
IWJF also aimed at being recognized by the IOC. The arguments against the 
recognition of the IJF put forward by the representatives of the IWJF reflect not only 
the sport political controversies of the time, but also an ideological frame in which the 
dominance of the Kodokan was seen as a threat to the cultural and religious identity 
of the West. 
In February 1955 Jack Robinson, president of the IWJF and president of the 
Johannesburg based Judokwai, asked for affiliation of the IWJF and for the inclusion 
of judo into the Games of 1956 (letter to Brundage, February 16, 1955). Jack 
Robinson, a self-awarded 10th dan, had immigrated to South Africa from Britain and 
started to teach his own form of judo. He had founded the South African National 
Amateur Judo Association (SANAJA) and worked as instructor for the police and the 
military.45 Already in this first letter to the IOC, Robinson connects the choice of the 
international body that will present judo sport to an ideological choice between West 
or Far East (Japan). Robinson argues that in judo “the Western World are superior to 
Japan” and that the Japanese are avoiding “combat” as their defeat “is a moral 
certainty”, more over “…I must state there [sic]  principles and rules could never be 
accepted by the Western world, who refuses to bow on there [sic] knees.”46 Robinson 
is seemingly referring to the ritual of greeting, but metaphorically transfers this ritual 
on an ideological level: the West will not surrender to the East. The matter was 
handed over to Otto Mayer, who informed Robinson that the IJF was already 
registered with the IOC and that therefore his application could not be accepted. 
Additionally Mayer advises Robinson to get into contact with the IJF and form one 
                                                 
45
 The letter-head from February 16, 1955 actually shows to different abbreviations: S.A.J.J.A. and 
S.A.A.J.A. In his text he uses the term National Amateur Judo Association. 
Later with the South African Amateur Judo Association (SAAJA) a second body emerged, this 
organization was recognized by the government of South Africa and taught a judo based on the 
Kodokan judo. In the late 70's and the 1980's Judo in South Africa was controlled on-and-off by a 
Governing Body, comprising of members of both SAAJA and SANAJA. This committee was called the 
South African Judo Union (SAJU). Only in 1992, under the guidance of the National Olympic 
Committee of South Africa did all judo organizations in Africa unite in one association which was called 
Judo South Africa (JSA). 
46
 Robinson to Brundage, February 16, 1955. The trustworthiness of the organization is certainly 
undermined by the fact, that the letter-head of the Judokwai reads like the family register of the 
Robinson’s: president Jack Robinson; chairman: J.W. Robinson, publicity manager: A. Robinson; 
Courses & Display Secretary D.B. Robinson and the six member grading panel five members carry the 
family name Robinson (the names of the Robinson’s in the letter-head are also underlined in the 
original letter, most likely by Brundage himself). 
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international body.47 But the IJF was not willed to merge with the IWJF, a 
organization that was to diffuse in its administration as well as sporting aims. In his 
answer letter Robinson turns towards a more or less open “racist” vocabulary - 
referring to the “white men” and expressing his hope, “that every country will be 
officially recognized, and not only the yellow race” (Robinson to Mayer, March 2, 
1955). Robinson’s approach certainly has to be seen in the perspective of the 
relationship between South Africa and the IOC during the late 50’s and 60’s. The 
problem of Apartheid and racism in South African was a sensitive issue for the IOC 
and the pressure to exclude the South Africans from the Games became stronger 
and stronger from inside and outside the IOC.48 
Robinson resurfaces in 1961 and claims again that the Japanese organizations are 
not willing to form one body and ascribes this to “fear of defeat” (letter from February 
23, 1961). Robinson however is not aware of the fact, that in the meantime the 
"sporting liberal"49 Ira G. Emery, general secretary of the South African Olympic 
Association and president of the South African National Olympic Committee 
(SANOC), has written to the IJF describing the situation of judo in South Africa. In 
this letter Emery distances the South African Olympic Association from Robinson and 
his organization, as he is in their eyes a professional sportsmen (Emery to IJF, 
February 20, 1961; actually Robinson in his letter to the IOC from 2nd February 1955 
had already characterized himself as being a professional judo teacher for the police 
and military). That certainly weakened the position of Robinson and his attempt to 
remain an international sport official despite the growing international isolation of 
South African sportsmen and sport officials that in 1970 ultimately resulted in the 
expulsion of South Africa from the IOC. Robinson tries to maintain the image of a 
international sport administrator, who is writing on behalf of the IWJF,50 becoming 
more insisting, by using the media. In an interview to the Johannesburg “Star” 
(6.6.1961) he announces to go to Athens in order to participate in the meeting of the 
International Olympic Committee to “demand” that also the members of the IWJF are 
                                                 
47
 Mayer to Robinson, February 25, 1955. The same day Mayer also wrote a letter Kanô in which he 
advises Kanô how to further proceed in his application of having judo accepted into the program of the 
games and to ask for information about the IWJF. Letter from Otto Mayer to Kanô, February 25, 1955. 
48
 However Avery Brundage remained - despite growing concerns inside and outside the IOC – 
supportive towards the South African Government. Keech, “The ties that bind”, 73.  
49
 Keech, “The ties that bind”, 76. 
50
 However the president of the IWJF Knud Janson most likely being aware of the isolated position of 
Robinson, wrote to Mayer: “It is many years ago Major Robinson left us.” (August 7, 1960). 
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allowed to compete.51 As Robinson is not member of an organization that is affiliated 
to the IOC, he would not be aloud to participate. In his answer to Robinson Mayer – 
seemingly annoyed – makes clear that he regards ‘Robinson’s organization’ as 
professional, “…which renders any contact between the IOC and your body more 
difficult if not impossible".52 Mayer is thus taking the position of Emery and Kanô 
Risei, who stated in a letter from May 1961: “Except the I.J.F., there are some bodies 
of which substance is professional, such as the International World Judo Federation, 
but, serious amateur sportsmen are taking no notice of such bodies” (Kanô to Mayer, 
May 13, 1961). The accusation of not being an amateur organization had to be taken 
seriously. During the presidency of Avery Brundage (1952-1972) the attempt to keep 
the ideal of amateur sportsmen was one of the major issues within the IOC. 
Brundage like Coubertin saw the Olympic Movement as a religion: “A religion, whose 
ethical component Brundage summed up in the single word: amateurism”.53 The 
question of amateurism thus was also a welcome argument for the IWJF 
representatives. And not only Robinson, but also Stefan Aschenbrenner and Knud 
Janson, a Danish judo-pioneer as well as secretary and later president of the IWJF 
accused the IJF of being a professional and commercial organization: “Can CIO 
recognize a body (IJU) which as its presidium has a professionel [sic] Judohighschool 
(Kodokan)?”54 However, personal and sport political ties inside the IOC are strong. 
And Mayer turns toward Azuma, the former judomen and supporter of Kodokan judo, 
to ask for clarification. In his answer letter to Janson, we read: “There is no 
professional amongst the leaders of that Federation in Tokyo. There are of course 
some teachers, but who are not leaders of the Federation” (August 12, 1960). The 
Kodokan had in fact already in 1909 been transformed from a private enterprise to a 
                                                 
51
 This article was sent to Mayer by Emery with a letter dated June 7, 1961. However Mayer had 
already received a letter by Robinson dated June 5
th
 in which he announced his coming. The letter 
was answered by Mayer on the 8
th
 in which he makes sure that Robinson will not be received. In this 
letter Mayer also raises the question of professionalism again. To keep Kanô Risei informed about the 
moves of the IWJF Mayer makes sure that Emery’s letter as well as the newspaper clipping are 
forwarded to Kanô Risei. Mayer to Robinson, June 8, 1961 and Mayer to Emery, June 9, 1961.  
52
 Mayer to Robinson, June 8, 1961 and Emery to Mayer, June 7, 1961. 26.9.1961 In a letter Robinson 
denies that the IWJF is professional: …this is entirely untrue, it is more than likely that a number of 
Clubs affiliated to the I.J.F. are professionals, but as far as I am concerned and I feel with my 50 years 
experience of judo, there is no professionals at all in the world, for there is nothing on record of any 
Judo exponents fighting and competing for money, since 1923, in the days of Yukio Tani” (September 
26, 1961). 
53
 Guttmann, The Games Must Go On, 116. 
54
 Janson to Mayer, August 7, 1960. See also the letter by Janson to Mayer from August 20
th
 1962. 
The issue of education was also delicate inside the IJF. The Europeans were moving towards a clear 
definition of judo as a sport, whereas the Japanese stressed the educational value of judo. 
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foundation.55 And Kanô Risei could thus state in a letter to Brundage: “The 
International Judo Federation is naturally an amateur organization, and we will at this 
time renew the spirit of amateurism” (May 8, 1961). Yet the existence of professional 
judo teachers could not be denied and in the – already mentioned – IJF letter to the 
IOC from June 5, 1961, we subsequently read: “It is absolutely clear that judo 
professors cannot take part in the Games.” 
 
A second issue that was discussed around the recognition of the IJF is connected to 
the question of religious teachings in judo. The reverse diffusion of judo implied also 
an exotification of judo, as it was in the West connected to spirituality and Zen-
Buddhism. Elements that can not be found back in the writings Kanô Jigoro on judo. 
Kanô himself, as a typical intellectual of the Meiji-period, was not interested in 
religion, but in science. Above that we witness a promotion of State Shinto during the 
Meiji-period, whereas Buddhism was suppressed by the Japanese government. A 
martial art, based on Zen-Buddhism could not have received governmental support to 
the extent judo did. The identification of judo with Zen-Buddhism has to be seen as a 
process that took place with the diffusion of judo into the West. Even in sport history 
the unity of Japanese martial arts and Zen-buddhism was taken as granted, and a 
secularisation of judo observed.56 The question of this esoteric perception of judo is 
mirrored in the struggle of being international recognized by representing judo as 
governing body in the Olympic movement: “… Judo for the Japaneses [sic] and their 
followers is not alone a sport, but a “bodily way” for working with Zen-Buddhism 
(Buddhism of Samurai etc.) and codex of Bushido”; accusing the IJF of “…working on 
“a cocktail” of Zen-Buddhism, mysticism, Bushido…” (Janson to Mayer, August 5, 
1955). The following letters show that the IWJF sees the dominance of Kodokan judo 
as a threat to the Western world and that it is to protect the Christian world from 
Buddhist infiltration, and in fact from religious imperialism: “We in IWJF like Judo as a 
fine sport, therefore we are trying to save it from the grip of mysticism and aggressive 
Budhism [sic] missionary work”.57 In order to solve the question of a religious 
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 Cf. Niehaus, Leben und Werk Kanô Jigorôs (1860-1938), 219.  
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 E.g. Pfister, “Die Faszination des Exotischen?, 311-329. For Kanô’s judo concept cf. Niehaus, 
Leben und Werk. 
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 Letter from Janson to Mayer, January 21, 1956 and Janson to Mayer, January 3, 1956. Stephan 
Aschenbrenner (general secretary IWJF) and Julius Fleck (Disziplinpräsident IWJF) also argue from 
the standpoint that judo is promoting religion. However in their letters the argument is based on the 
notion, that what is called education in judo is nothing more than religious education. Stephan 
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background in judo Mayer consulted with the Japanese representative in the IOC, 
Ryôtarô Azuma, who denied any religious dimension in judo. (Mayer to Janson, 
February 14, 1956). Correspondence between the IWJF and the IOC basically 
stopped in the following years but was to be resumed after the IJF applied again to 
include judo into the program in 1960. Subsequently also the issue of Zen-Buddhism 
surfaced again in the second attempt of the IWJF to be recognized by the IOC. In 
August 1960 Otto Mayer is pressed by Knud Janson to recognize the IWJF, 
repeating his accusation of the IJF to be 'infiltrated' by Zen-Buddhist ideology (letter 
from August 7, 1960). Mayer repeats that there is no connection between Judo and 
Zen-Buddhism (letter from August 12, 1960). But Avery Brundage, who himself looks 
“with favor on some of the Zen-Buddhism principles”, inquires more detailed 
information about any connection between Zen-Buddhism and the “Kodokan Group” 
(Avery Brundage to Kanô Risei from July 16, 1962). A connection between judo and 
Zen-Buddhism is again categorically denied by Kanô: “…it is quite clear that Kodokan 
Judo has no connection with any religion” (Kanô to Brundage, August 30, 1962). The 
problem is further pushed, when Janson visits Mayer in Lausanne and hands over a 
memorandum on the issue, in which he warns, that “…the united Buddhism these 
years is trying to make a great push inside the Christian Western culture” with its 
“main weapon” Zen-Buddhism. The fact that the members of the IOC might not heard 
about the synthesis of judo and Zen-Buddhism is in his view, “because a Japanese – 
f.i. a highgraduated Judoka – does not speak much about Zen-Buddhism, “he lives 
Zen instead of speaking it” (Letter from Janson to IOC, August 20, 1962). The 
attempts of the IWJF to be recognized and to discredit the IJF by attacking the 
Kodokan were without success. But the position of the Kodokan inside the IJF was 
certainly weakened. Inside the IJF Europeans and Americans strongly moved 
towards a sport judo, and in 1965 the presidency was taken over by the British 
Charles Palmer, ending the hegemony of the Kodokan for the following 14 years. 
 
Conclusion 
It has been shown that Kodokan judo became a metaphor for the Japanese nation in 
the post war years and that Olympic judo proved to be fruitful in positively reinventing 
Japanese tradition and promoting judo as cultural basis for rebuilding Japan and for 
future economic success.  
                                                                                                                                                        
Aschenbrenner to Comite International Olympique, August 2, 1956 and Fleck to Brundage, August 10, 
1956.  
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The diffusion of judo into the West resulted in incorporating the outer characteristics 
of Western sporting traditions. The perception of a cultural phenomenon like judo 
however does not need not refer to any existing reality. The analysis of the West’s 
perception of judo showed that it is deeply rooted in the modes of perceiving the East 
in general: ascribing to judo a spirituality and a religious dimension. A basis that 
cannot be found in the writings of Kanô Jigorô, whose concept of judo was pragmatic 
and based on its value for a moral and physical education of the Japanese youth. 
Based on this perception the IWJF saw the inclusion of Kodokan judo into the 
Olympic program not only as threat to Christian sporting traditions, but also as a tool 
of a religious imperialism that tried to spread Buddhism throughout the world by 
means of sport.  
Considering the significance of the Western exotification of judo, Olympic judo - 
despite the adoption to Western sporting traditions and Olympic rules - certainly 
helped to internationalize the Olympic Movement in the eyes of the spectators. 
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